

шюры, которая, по нашему убеждению, заключается в том, что стремление казенных железных дорог направить хлебные грузы южного района в Либаву и Ригу преимущественно перед Кёнигсбергом очень неприятно Юго-Западным дорогам как затрагивающее их личные интересы, которые автор желает прикрыть интересами государственными.


К чему вся эта изложенная в брошюре лекция из политической экономии? К чему эти натянутые примеры о разности цен и разности фрахтов между Николаевым и Кёнигсбергом, русскими портами и иностранными в Балтийском море? Тарифная политика управления Юго-Западных дорог известна: она преследует единственную цель — привлечение всеми способами наибольшего количества грузов к следованию по своим дорогам в оба направления — и к Одессе и к Граеву — цель весьма естественная для акционерного общества. От-

крытие конкурирующих путей неприятно Юго-Западным дорогам, это также понятно: но при чем же тут законы политической экономии и государственные интересы? Прикрываться этими интересами казенные дороги не имеют надобности, ибо их интересы всегда вполне тождественны с интересами государственными, тогда как интересы частного акционерного общества, стремящегося главным образом к увеличению своих прибылей и к возвышению ценности своих акций, не всегда совпадают с общегосударственными интересами и тем менее подчиняются законам политической экономии.

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MEDIA ARCHIVES

WITH REGARD TO THE BROCHURE «RUSSIAN PORTS AND RAILWAY TARIFFS»

A few days ago a brochure of an unknown author «Russian ports and railway tariffs» was published, belonging, apparently to one of the senior managers of the Society of South-West Railways.

The main purpose of this brochure is to prove incorrectness of actions of state-owned railways, seeking to patronize Russian ports over foreign ports through tariff combinations. The brochure is caused by the fact that in the settlement, together with representatives of Russian and German railways involved in transportation, of tariffs on grain cargoes coming from the south of Russia through Polesie state-owned railways in Koenigsberg (via Verzhbolovo), with tariffs on Libau and Riga (via Vilna), temporary administration of state-owned railways found it necessary that the total freight charge from all points of departure to Koenigsberg was always higher than to Libau and Riga by 1 kopeck per pood (6 rubles 10 kopecks per railcar of 610 poods).

Representative of government department of Bromberg railway district at the conference held on

December 4, 1884 in St. Petersburg agreed with such a difference in favor of Riga and Libau, and it was approved by the protocol of the conference of the German Union, signed on December 23, 1884 and submitted to the approval of the Ministry of Railways.

As for this difference, the author of the brochure sees violation of interests of South-West Railways, but leaving aside, apparently, just tries to prove illegality and impracticality of such an order.

He claims that the case of such paramount importance as the support of Russian ports by railway tariffs cannot be given to the discretion of administration of private or state-owned railways, and is subject to review by the government.

The author forgets that provisions, developed at the conference of the German Union, are submitted obligatory for governmental approval and once approved will come into effect. The author probably does not know that tariff of direct communication, which involves state-owned railways, is not published and not be put into effect before its consideration



and approval of temporary administration of state-owned railways and the Ministry. Therefore, the charge of the local administration of state-controlled railways in any arbitrary establishment of whatsoever tariff breaks up.

Then the author leaves aside an issue of patronage of Russian ports and addresses the question of how much more profitable it is to carry the load from the places nearest to the Black Sea: to Nikolaev, or to Königsberg. The question is old, quite exhausted, but nevertheless raised by the South- West Railways when it comes down to the diversion of grain cargoes from the Black Sea ports to Königsberg.

The author reiterates an old thesis, that for the state it is more profitable when cargo goes along Russian railways. Who doubts it? But it is necessary to deny a benefit when it seeks to disrupt natural conditions of economic life. The author says that the railway cannot put nothing artificial in economic life, and he also contradicts himself by proving the correctness of diversion of grain cargo from point, located on the place of production in 147 versts (Dolinskaya and Nikolaev), to the point located in 1 500 versts (Königsberg). Does it not violate the economic life of the country?

The author rightly says that cargo aspires to where it is more profitable for it. But how is this benefit created? It consists of local conveniences at destination point and cheapness of freight. The first condition is outside railways, the second one belongs entirely to them.

We would totally agree with the author that the administrations of railways, strictly fulfilling their task, should not have any relationship to a change in these conditions; but only in such a case, if all Russian railways, having developed through practice known freight tariffs for transportation of known cargo from one station of its railway to the other, will apply these tariffs in a given period of time for all shipments within these limits, and in this direction, without any relation to from where and where the cargo follows beyond their lines; i. e., in other words, when the immutability of uniform tariffs for transportation items at a certain period of time from one point of its railway to another in the same direction.

But if railways have established a right to vary their tariff rates within the same points of their railway, depending on the origin and destination of other railways, if they found it necessary to establish agreed direct tariff for a whole route from the initial point of production to final distribution, if they are not limited to the line of Russian Railways, but go further and enter into alliances with foreign roads and waterways, they fully enjoy their right to change conditions of advantages of one point over another. And if South- West Railways, taking advantage of

this right, patronize Königsberg and Danzig through attraction to them by tariff combinations of grain cargoes from such distant points as Dolinskaya, the least of all South- West roads have a right to make a reproach to state railways, which allow tariff difference in favor of Libau and Riga to Königsberg and Danzig. Basis of these roads to establish the differences are different, namely South- West Railways do this in a kind of big run of cargo on its way, the state-owned railways mostly to direct grain cargoes to the Russian ports instead of foreign ones and for delivering these goods of more mileage on Russian roads as state-owned and private. For example: from Rivne on a journey to Königsberg cargo passes through Russian railways 448 versts, while moving to Libau 838 versts and to Riga 848 versts.

The author of the brochure is not honest. Arguing about expediency of the longest direction of goods by rail, he cites an extreme case as an example: what is more profitable if the cargo, going to a distance of 1000 versts in one direction, runs through Russian railways 100 versts and 900 versts through foreign and in the other direction vice versa. Here is the error that a taken distance is equal to 1000 versts. The question should be put this way: if in the same direction all the stretch is 1000 versts, and in the other it is 1500 versts, and in the 1st direction cargo moves through Russian railways 300 versts and through foreign or water 700 versts, and in the 2nd direction cargo moves on Russian railways 1000 versts and on foreign or water only 500 versts, whether the railways aim to divert cargo from the 1st direction and to attract it to the 2nd? According to the author – yes, they should and must, because it is done for benefits of railways and the state. In our opinion – no, the shortest direction is the most natural and correct. Alternative long directions are entitled not only to destroy the shortest direction, but also to harm them, forcing them to fall, not caused by other needs, except for competitions of alternative directions.

The author forgets that the longest directions, diverting cargo from natural, shortest way, deprive of these goods the roads that as the closest travel line have a preferential right for these goods.

The author is not honest, we repeat, because he does not want to state clearly the purpose, which can be read between the lines in his brochure, the goal is to prove that the most favorable direction of the goods on which they pass the greatest distance not on Russian railways in general, but only on South- West, and, moreover, in the direction that the South- West Railway see as the most favorable for them.

South- West Railways do not like Nikolaev, about which so much has been said in the brochure. What for Nikolaev, when near them there is an

incomparably best port – Odessa, about bringing the goods to which the author is modestly silent! Libau and Riga are also unpleasant for Southwestern roads, especially when goods are those that belonged entirely to the direction Grajewo-Koenigsberg, with the opening of Vilna-Rivne region of Polesie railways were shipped on the shortest way through Rivne-Vilna to Libau and Riga, and the South-West roads lost the run from Rivne to Graevo of 448 versts.

Here is the main cause of all arguments and evidence about the incorrectness of encouragement of Russian ports. Libau and Riga, using the freight difference in their favor at 6 rubles 10 kopecks per car against Koenigsberg and having currently the shortest direction for grain cargoes through southern area through Rivne-Vilna, are really dangerous rivals of the grain direction to Koenigsberg and Danzig, and at the same time take away the South -West Railway 448 versts run of grain cargoes.

The author of the brochure argues that by encouraging Russian ports, especially Libau, we encourage foreign trade in Libau, foreign exporters and foreign commercial fleet since we do not have our own. As a proof the author gives a speech of Prince Bismarck on Libau port, which he made on 49 meeting of the Reichstag on February 14, 1885.

All this is true, and the speech of Prince Bismarck proves, that Germans used the Russian port of Libau and managed to put it in favorable conditions. But in Koenigsberg and Danzig, who enjoys the benefits of trade in Russian bread? Germans who live in these ports, German exporters, German commercial fleet with the addition thereto of German Railways and German forwarders on our border crossings. Why, according to the author, favoring Russian ports, Riga and Libau, we provide greater protection to Germans than sending cargoes to Koenigsberg and Danzig? The author forgets that, replacing German ports with Russian ports, we give Russian ports those local benefits that are exclusively obtained by foreigners in their ports. These benefits are expressed in people's earnings in that ports on loading, unloading, delivery, development of port cities by population increase, albeit foreign, and these benefits are not so unimportant that they to be ignored. The mere elimination of intermediate freight forwarders at the border land areas (in Verzhbolov and Graevo) is worth giving preference to Russian ports.

The author of the brochure foresees a brake for development of commercial fleet in encouraging Russian ports. «While there is no merchant fleet, – he said – there can be no question of the establishment of Russian ports with national economic importance ... If Russian

products are shipped on foreign vessels, all favorable conditions created for the development of Russian ports will benefit foreigners which thus will develop their economic power at the expense of the entire Russian population».

Our opinion is completely opposite: there are no developed Russian ports yet, there is no question about Russian merchant fleet, it can be created only in Russian ports, which will give it ways and opportunities for development. While our products are attracted to foreign ports, future Russian fleet has nothing to transport from Russian ports, and it could not come.

When Russian ports receive primary importance on the Baltic Sea, when foreign vessels will be mainly directed to them, while at the same ports Russian ships appear, Russian merchant fleet is created by itself.

We do not stop on those provisions of the author, which he claims in the 3rd section of the brochure, on measures required to develop Russian ports and Russian merchant fleet, providing analysis of those provisions to persons more competent in resolving these issues. Our task is to find out the real purpose of the brochure, which, in our opinion, is that the desire of state railways to direct grain cargoes of southern area to Libau and Riga predominantly to Koenigsberg is very unpleasant for South-West Railways as affecting their personal interests, which the author wishes to cover with the interests of the state.

Why all this talk on political economy outlined in the brochure? What is the use of these awkward examples of difference in prices and freight between Odessa and Koenigsberg, Russian and foreign ports in the Baltic Sea? Tariff policy of management of Southwest Road is known: it has one goal – to attract the greatest number of goods for transportation on its roads in both directions – to Odessa and to Graevo – the goal is quite natural for the stock company. The opening of competing routes is unpleasant for South –West Railways, it is also clear: but what is the reason for mentioning the laws of political economy and public interests? State-owned roads do not have to hide behind these interests, since their interests are always quite identical with the interests of the state, while the interests of the private joint-stock company, mainly seeking to increase their profits and to raise the value of their shares does not always coincide with the national interests and subject to the laws of political economy.

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